

THE DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

NIC #5266-83  
21 July 1983

NOTE FOR: NIO/At-Large (David B. Low)

FROM : MG Atkeson  
NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : Long-Range Planning for the  
Intelligence Community


25X1

Attached are a couple of suggestions that may be useful in describing the environment against which long-range intelligence community goals can be established (Phase I of the project you outlined in your memorandum of 1 July). Neither of these are totally new: they are upon us now. But both will be key characteristics of the next decade with which the community must cope.

25X1

We have defined these two issue areas in rather general terms and have not attempted to flesh out resource requirements. To do so will require a great deal of additional thought and discussion within our element of the community

25X1

  
Edward B. Atkeson

Attachment:

25X1

Approved For Release 2008/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00757R000100190008-3

NIC #566-83

NOTE FOR: NIO/At-Large, David B. Low

FROM : MG Atkeson  
NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : Long-Range Planning for the  
Intelligence Community

25X1

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee (w/att)
- 1 - DDI Reg. (wo/att)
- 1 - NIO/GPF (w/att)
- 2 - A/NIO/GPFs (w/att)
- 1 - NIO/GPF File (w/att)
- 1 - NIO/GPF Chrono (w/att) —

SECRET

25X1

ISSUE: General Purpose Forces Weapons Technology

In the 1990s the key factor in the growth of Soviet general purpose force capabilities will be technology. The advances already made in the 1970s and 1980s have been substantial: as noted by Marshal Grechko in 1975 when speaking of the armor-antiarmor challenge, the NATO-Warsaw Pact competition has "shifted to the science-research laboratories." In the 1990s, however, the speed of technological change, per se, will increase as will the frequency of breakthrough in fielded technology. While sheer numbers will continue to dominate military balance equations, technology competition will increasingly be a critical force multiplier.

Another result of advances in weapon technology will be growth in the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry outside of the traditional major power alliances. Lessons learned in the Middle East (e.g., the Lebanon conflict) and elsewhere (e.g., the Falklands) already have impressed small powers of the criticality of owning the latest and the best in weaponry. The increasing availability of more lethal and longer-range weaponry will increase the likelihood and severity of skip-border conflicts among these nations.

SECRET

NIO/GPF  
7/21/83

25X1

25X1

Technologies that will impact heavily on battlefield capabilities include:

- Materials: particularly armor arrays, composites, and ceramics.
- Electronics and micro-electronics: with applications for target acquisition and weapons guidance, battlefield computers, electro-optics, command and control, radar and sonar signal processing, and electronic warfare.
- Lasers: both for weapon system guidance and for weapons' applications.
- Space systems: in support of battlefield management tasks such as reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and command and control communications.

The potential rate of technological progress as well as the nature of new technologies will pose significant challenges to intelligence collection and analysis.

- Improved collection (both technical--e.g., SIGINT and PHOTINT) and analytic capabilities will be

required to enhance our capability to identify and follow Soviet military research and development programs.

-- Focused HUMINT efforts will increasingly be required to identify key Soviet scientific programs with potential applications for military technology.

-- More sophisticated imagery [ ] will be required to support the assessment of weapon system characteristics when new systems are in the R&D phase and to monitor deployments once series production is under way.

25X1

-- Increased imagery collection and processing capacity will be required [ ]

25X1

-- Increased resources will have to be devoted to the analysis of general purpose weapon programs.

ISSUE: Soviet Power Projection

The United States is likely to be confronted in the 1990s with a proliferation of Soviet military and military-support facilities around the globe--and the potential their access offers for strategic leverage against the West--in areas which are now neutral or even friendly to the US and its allies. By 1995 the USSR will be capable of using one or two conventional aircraft carriers for power projection and of rapidly moving troops and equipment worldwide in a fleet of large-capacity/long-range transport aircraft (the CONDOR-A).

Intelligence collection increasingly will be required to focus on non-traditional regions of potential conflict and challenge to US and Western interests. HUMINT, in particular, will be required to focus on the extra-regional military implications of Soviet political maneuvering in the Third World. Technical collection assets will be required to monitor the activities of Soviet military forces as their reach increasingly expands outward from the confines of the USSR and its border regions. Intelligence community analytic elements which traditionally have focused on indigenous and intra-regional issues will increasingly be called upon to assess the implications of the Soviet presence (military and non-military) overseas for US and NATO military capabilities.